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"Imagine the frustration of being a judge. You may be the subject of constant 
criticism, but you can never defend yourself: that's the rules." 1 
I INTRODUCTION 
Every day in New Zealand, the judiciary makes an appearance in the media: a 
sound bite from a judgment, an excerpt from a sentencing report, or television footage 
of court proceedings. Everyone quickly weighs in with fact and opinion: the man on 
the street, the Member of Parliament, the academic, the accused, the lawyer, the 
journalist. Yet one actor is remarkably silent in the public debate: the judge. 
This essay will examine the rights of expression judges have off the bench, the 
legal rules that govern such conduct, and the policy reasons for restricting extra-
judicial speech. Because of the powerful and very public nature of the judicial office, a 
judge' s conduct out of court is bound to be the subject of scrutiny and comment. 
Extra-judicial conduct can affect the discharge of the judicial office and can reflect 
negatively upon a particular judge or the judiciary in general. 
The judiciary is founded on the principles of independence and impartiality, but 
these pr~nciples in turn rest heavily on the public ' s confidence in judges. Recognition 
of the importance of public confidence in the judiciary is the first step in recognising 
that judges have an equally strong obligation to be more open, upfront and accessible. 
The traditional view that requires judges to be "insulated"2 from the public is no longer 
acceptable. 
This essay will argue that the freedom of expression of judges off the bench is 
too strictly limited, and that a better balance between the traditional notions of "rules" 
regarding extra-judicial speech and the more open texture of the modern judge's role in 
the community must be found. The values that limit freedom of expression for judges 
and the complacency that maintains these limits need to be re-examined. This essay 
proposes a test to assist judges in deciding when extra-judicial expression is 
appropriate, and when it is not. The test asks whether the conduct in question is so 
1 Interview with Chief District Court Judge Young in Rosemary McLeod "Judgement Days" (18 March 
200 l) Sunday Star-Times Wellington Cl. Chief Judge Young has since been appointed to the High 
Court. 
clearly destructive of the judicial responsibilities of impartiality and independence that 
it would create in the public a perception that the judge's ability to execute the judicial 
office is sufficiently undermined. 
11 CASE STUDIES 
Three recent events highlight the need for a re-examination of extra-judicial 
expression. 
The first is an article on the sentencing of two women convicted of killing a 
toddler. 3 The report centres on the sentences given to the two women, and reports 
strong criticism of the apparent lightness of the sentences given by Durie J. The police 
inspector who headed the investigation, the head of the Women' s Refuge, and a 
spokesperson from the Sensible Sentencing Trust all express their disappointment with 
the Judge' s sentencing. The article includes a short excerpt of the judgment, reporting 
the Judge' s comments on the need for children to be protected and nurtured, and 
expressing his "suspicions" about some of the evidence presented before him. The 
article does not include any of Durie J ' s reasoning for the sentences given, or any 
direct comment from him about sentencing. Is Durie J allowed to face his critics, to 
explain his judgment and the rules on sentencing? 
The second recent news story concerns the surprise resignation of "popular" 
District Court Judge Tony Christiansen.4 It includes speculation on the real reason for 
the resignation, a complaint by a court worker of inappropriate behaviour by the Judge 
in his motel room. The article states the Judge cited "personal reasons" and the "strains 
of the job" as being behind his decision to leave the bench. The artic1e also quotes the 
acting Attorney-General as saying the Judge resigned in order to prevent bringing the 
judiciary into disrepute. The acting Attorney-General said he did not think Judge 
Christiansen had done anything which could have resulted in charges and applauded 
the Judge for leaving the bench and therefore bringing the matter to a close. Is the 
public satisfied with these answers? If Judge Christiansen did not do anything that 
2 AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - The Kilmuir Rules'' [ 1986] Public Law 383, 385 
3 Erin Kennedy " Lillybing ' s Death 'Preventable"' and "Namana may be out in Four Years" (l 6 June 
2001) The Dominion Wellington. 
4 Rachel Grunwell and ick Maling "Judge Quits after Motel Incident" (17 June 2001) Sunday Star-
Times Wellington A 1. 
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could result in a criminal charge, 1s the public losing a valuable member of the 
judiciary for no good reason? 
The third event occurred in June 2001, when three Court of Appeal judges 
agreed, at the request of the Minister of Justice, to be present at a closed-door briefing 
by the Government. The briefing was designed to persuade Member of Parliament 
Nandor Tanczos to drop his objections to the Crimes (Criminal Appeals) Amendment 
Bill. An opinion piece in the Evening Post alleged that when the judges briefed 
Tanczos in private, at the request of the Government, the "separation of powers went to 
hell ."5 Is this "political manipulation" at its worst,6 or were the judges simply 
providing valuable expertise on an important piece of1egis1ation? 
The above examples highlight the reality in New Zealand: outside their 
judgments, judges are elusive. Judges rarely speak off the bench, whether to defend 
themselves or the judiciary from attack. 
Currently in New Zealand there are no written guidelines or rules concerning 
extra-judicial conduct. There is also no judicial commission in New Zealand to 
consider complaints of inappropriate conduct. The Beattie Report, a comprehensive 
study of the court system in New Zealand, recommended such a commission in 1978.7 
Presently, a complaint may be referred to the Chief Justice, or a retired judge may be 
asked to inquire into the allegation. If necessary, a complaint may be reported to the 
Minister of Justice.8 As the Beattie Report highlighted, the current system is 
problematic because there is a " lack of public knowledge of the way in which a 
complaint considered justified can be brought forward ." 9 
5 Steven Price "Dangers in Judges Briefing Tanczos" ( 19 June 200 l) The Evemng Post Wellington 6. 
6 ACT New Zealand "Goff Using Appeal Court Judges like Own Officials" (12 June 2001) Press 
Release. 
7 Beattie, Sir David Stuart Report of Royal Commission on the ( 'ourts, 1978 (EC Keating Government 
Printer, Wellington, 1978). 
8 Report of the New Zea/and Judiciary 1999 (Wellington, 1999) 9-10: Complaints against judges in New 
Zealand are listed in a small section of the annual Report of the New Zealand Judiciary. In 1999, there 
were no complaints made against Court of Appeal judges, four complaints against High Court judges, 
and 24 complaints against District Court judges. The Report does not outline the complaints in any 
detail nor does it explain how they were investigated (or by whom). One High Court judge was 
"counselled" about body language, and one District Court judge apologised to a litigant for conduct in 
court. The other 26 complaints were found to be ''without substance." 
9 RL Young "Judicial Independence and Accountability in New Zealand" ( 1998) 45 Federal Lawyer 40, 
45 . 
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Ill THE ARGUMENT FOR WRITTEN GUIDELINES 
As this essay wiJl show, there is a need for the judiciary in New Zealand to 
seriously consider the substantive limits on its freedom of expression. These limits 
should be formalised, lest critics insist that judicative discipline is "wishful error."10 
There are other reasons for formalising restrictions in writing. Firstly, the public 
cannot, as things currently stand, assume judges wi11 always do the right thing, or even 
know what the right thing is. Secondly, written guidelines would allow limitations on 
conduct to be made accessible to all members of the judiciary. 
Such guidelines can take different forms. A comprehensive code of conduct 
like the American Bar Association ' s Model Code of Judicial Conduct consists of broad 
statements of principle as well as specific authoritative rules. 11 A document such as 
the Canadian Judicial Council ' s Ethical Principles for Judges is advisory only, and 
includes general standards of behaviour to which all judges should strive. 12 
Rather than a detailed code like the American Bar Association ' s Model Code, 
the New Zealand judiciary would benefit from the more general approach of the 
Canadian Judicial Council 's Ethical Principles. Codification of every potential off the 
bench situation is impractical as well as undesirable. 13 Guidelines based more broadly 
on core principles are more flexible and adaptable to different situations over time. 
Certainly, previously accepted judicial practices change over time. For example, 
involvement in politics by judges was not discouraged as late as the 1960s, whereas 
10 DF Dugdale "A Polite Response to Mr Justice Thomas" (1993) 23 VUWLR, 128. 
11 American Bar Association, Model ('ode of Judicial Conduct 
<http://www.law.sc.edu/freeman/cjc5l.htm>. For example: Canon 2, Rule C: "A judge shall not hold 
membership in any organization that practices invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion 
or national origin." 
The ABA does not provide any mechanism of enforcement, but all fifty states now have permanent 
judicial commissions to hear and investigate complaints. On a federal level, Congress and the Judicial 
Conference have mechanisms for handling complains against federal judges. See Jeffrey M Shaman, 
Steven Lubet and James J Alfini Judicial Conduct and Ethics (2 ed, Michie, Charlottesville, 1995), 
Foreword. 
12 Canadian Judicial Council, Ethical Principles for Judges (Ottawa, 1998) <http-//www.cjc-
ccm.gc.ca/english/ethic _ e.pdf>. For example, Principle 6D(3)(a): "Judges should refrain from 
membership in political parties and political fund raising." 
Although the Ethical Principles are advisory only, the Canadian Judicial Council has the power to 
initiate formal investigations under amendments to the Judges Act in 1971 to determine whether a judge 
should be removed from office. 
13 The Model Code is intended to govern conduct of judges both on and off the bench and to be binding 
upon them. It is very comprehensive in its scope, and deals with matters from facial expression and 
4 
now there may be said to be a convention against political activity by the judiciary. 14 
In a modem context, in Canada it is presently no longer considered appropriate for 
judges to accept positions on boards of schools, hospitals or charitable foundations 
because such organisations are now involved regularly in litigation and matters of 
bl
. 15 pu 1c controversy. 
A more principled approach rather than a code would assist in providing useful 
direction in grey areas, even if definitive answers were not given. Minimum standards 
for judicial conduct in dealing with the media, for example, or for discussing 
judgments in public, would be valuable to assist judges before there are problems. 
Formalising limitations would also challenge judges to think about the limits of 
extra-judicial expression. Written guidelines would encourage greater consideration 
by judges of their accountability to the public, as well as their right to freedom of 
expression. Certainly, a general guide might not give enough guidance to some judges, 
who may invariably say inappropriate things off the bench. But this risk is worth the 
effort to preserve freedom of expression as well as judicial independence and 
impartiality. 
Perhaps most importantly, the public needs to see that judges have thought 
carefully about extra-judicial conduct, and have considered their role within the wider 
community. Judges must promote transparency, both on and off the bench, to further 
enhance public confidence. 
While the form that such guidelines on extra-judicial conduct could take is 
important, the substance of those guidelines is the key issue in this essay. What are the 
current legal limitations on judges speaking off the bench? Before examining in detail 
the factors which must be considered in formulating a test for off the bench conduct, it 
is important to understand the ambit of freedom of expression under the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA). In particular, what are the boundaries of freedom for 
judges? Is the judiciary's access to the BORA limited in any way? [f so, are these 
limitations justified in a free and democratic society? 
body language of a judge (Model Code, Canon 3(5)), to fund-raising for charities (Model Code, Canon 
4C(3)(b)(i)). 
14 Mr Justice Thomas Judicial Ethics in Australia (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1988) 35. 
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IV NEW ZEALAND BILL OF RIGHTS ACT 1990 
A Generally 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) was drafted to affirm and 
protect New Zealand' s commitment to human rights on a national level. It draws from 
other human rights documents, particularly the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The 
BORA is neither entrenched, nor is it supreme law. 16 The BORA does not impliedly 
repeal or revoke any enactment held to be inconsistent with it. 17 
Although the BORA passed through the usual legislative process, it has 
emerged as a unique piece of legislation. Since the early 1990s, the view has 
developed through case law and jurisprudence that the BORA "requires development 
of the law where necessary"18 and, in line with the approach taken to other human 
rights documents, calls for a generous interpretation rather than a strict legalistic 
construction. 19 
In order to determine whether unjustifiable or unreasonable limits have been 
placed on judges that have the effect of curtailing their freedom of expression, it is 
important to first determine whether section 14 of the BORA is broad enough to 
encompass extra-judicial "expression." 
B Section 14: The Ambit of the Freedom 
Freedom of Expression - Everyone has the right to freedom of expression, including the 
freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any form. 
15 Ethical Principles, above, 36. 
16 Although the BORA is not legally entrenched, there is a practical sanctity about it. It would be 
politically dangerous for any government to repeal it, or to breach it intentionally; in this sense, the 
BORA is practically entrenched. 
17 
Bill of Rights Act 1990 (BORA) s 4. Unlike in Canada, where the Courts have the power to declare 
legislation invalid if it is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Courts in ew 
Zealand are bound by section 4 to acknowledge the validity of all legislation enacted by Parliament. See 
also Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Re11iew [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 15 (CA). 
18 
Ministry of Transport v Noort [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 270 (CA) Cooke P. 
6 
The White Paper that preceded the BORA proposed freedom of expression as a 
provision of "central importance" in a democratic state. 20 As drafted, freedom was 
intended to allow "individual fulfilment through self expression" and "to advance 
knowledge and reveal truth."2 t In Moonen v Film and Literature Board ofReview, the 
Court of Appeal described the right to freedom of expression under section 14 as being 
"as wide as human thought and imagination. "22 
Section 14 was drafted to cover vanous forms that expression might take, 
including "written and oral communications, newspapers and electronic media, and 
public and private gatherings. "23 The ICCPR, to which New Zealand's commitment is 
affirmed in the long title of the BORA, establishes that the right includes the: 24 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of. .. choice. 
International case law also stresses the broad ambit of the freedom of 
expression. In R v Kopyto, the significance in a democratic society of freedom of 
expression was strongly emphasised by Cory JA: 25 
[a] democracy cannot exist without the freedom to express new ideas and to put forward 
opinions about the functioning of public institutions ... the very lifeblood of democracy is the 
free exchange of ideas and opinions. 
Freedom of expression includes "not only the inoffensive but the irritating, the 
contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and the provocative."26 In R v 
Keegstra, Dickson CJ said that apart from the rare cases where expression 1s 
communicated in a physically violent form , the fundamental nature of freedom of 
expression ensures that:27 
19 Noori, above, 268 Cooke P. 
20 
A Bill of Rights for New Zealand: A White Paper ( 1985), 79. Freedom of expression was cl 7 of the 
draft bill. 
21 A White Paper, above, 79. 
22 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board qf Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 15 (CA). 
23 
Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant Huscroft and 
Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and Freedoms: The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 173. 
24 
lCCPR art 19(2) 
25 
R v Kopyto (J 987) 24 OAC 81 , 90. 
26 
Redmond Bare v DPP (1999) 7 BHRC 375, 383 . 
27 
R v Keegstra [1990] 3 SCR 697, 729. 
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if the activity conveys or attempts to convey a meaning, it has expressive content and prima 
facie fatls within the scope of the guarantee. In other words, the term "expression" as used 
in ... the [Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms] embraces all content of expression 
irrespective of the particular meaning or message sought to be conveyed. 
Freedom of expression has a wide ambit and aims to protect a rich variety of 
forms of expression. Under this broad reading of section 14, anything judges say off 
the bench can be considered "expression" under the BORA. Durie J could express his 
personal views on the current sentencing laws. Judge Christiansen might publicly 
discuss the intimate details of his resignation. The three Court of Appeal judges could 
begin openly lobbying Members of Parliament on the Crimes (Criminal Appeals) 
Amendment Bill. These are all clearly forms of expression under the BORA. But 
necessarily, the BORA incorporates limits to the potentially broad scope of freedom of 
expression. 
Firstly, section 4 states that if another enactment is inconsistent with the rights 
and freedoms listed in the BORA, then the other enactment prevails. Secondly, subject 
to section 4, section 5 of the BORA recognises that rights and freedoms are subject to 
"justified limitations." Are there any enactments regarding extra-judicial free speech? 
C Legal Limitations on Judicial Freedom of Expression 
1 Section -I: Other Enactments 
There are statutes and rules of the common law that relate to a judge' s conduct 
in court. Under provisions of the Judicature Act 1908, the judges of superior courts 
were to hold office during good behaviour and be removed only by Parliament (rather 
than at the will and pleasure of the Crown). This provision on tenure was superseded 
by section 23 of the Constitution Act l 986, which states that judges of the High Court 
shall only be removed by the Crown on the grounds of misbehaviour or incapacity to 
discharge the functions of the judicial office. Section 7 of the District Courts Act 194 7 
provides for the removal of a district court judge by the Governor-General for inability 
or misbehaviour. Section 18 of the Oaths and Declarations Act l 957 requires judges to 
act without "fear or favour, affection or ill will ." 
8 
There is no legislation in New Zealand that deals explicitly with judicial 
conduct off the bench, however there are long recognised conventions and practices 
affecting judges' behaviour out of court. Most of these have been reduced to " informal 
rules of judicial conduct"28 concerning conflict of interest, outside employment, 
associations, public comment onjudgments, and general behaviour. 
For example, upon appointment, it is convention that a judge resign from any 
political party of which he or she is a member. It is convention that a judge not 
comment on his or her judgment once it is written.29 It is also convention that judges 
not publicly defend themselves or their decisions.30 
Reference is sometimes made to the so-called Kilmuir Rules governing judicial 
appearances in the media. The Rules derived their name from a letter written in 1955 
by Lord Kilmuir LC to the Director-General of the BBC, responding to a request for 
interviews relating to a project about "great Judges of the past." Denying the BBC's 
request, Lord Kilmuir stressed the importance of keeping judiciary insulated from 
"controversies of the day." He wrote that a judge must "keep silent [so] his reputation 
for wisdom and impartiality remains unassailable .. . [E]very utterance which he makes 
in public ... must necessarily bring him within the focus of criticism. "31 
This approach was confinned in R v Commissioner of the Police of the 
Metropolis, where a writer from Punch was charged with contempt for lambasting the 
Court of Appeal in an article. In his judgment, Lord Denning beseeched the public to 
understand : 32 
all we would ask is that those who criticise us will remember that, from the nature of our office, 
we cannot reply to .. criticisms [and] cannot enter into public controversy. Still less into 
political controversy. 
28 Patricia L Cumming "Governing Judicial Conduct" (1996) 45 UNBLJ 23, 24 . 
29 Hon John Doyle "Judicial Standards: Contemporary Constraints on Judges - The Australian 
Experience" (2001) 75 ALJ 96, 98. 
30 Interview with research counsel for Chief Judge Young (the author, Wellington, 30 March 2001). The 
counsel confirmed Chief Judge Young was referring to "convention only" in his interview with the 
Sunday Star-Times (see Rosemary McLeod "Judgement Days" (18 March 2001) Sunday Star-times 
Wellington Cl). 
31 AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - The Kilmuir Rules" [ 1986] Public Law 383, 385 . 
9 
There is no legislation governing judicial conduct off the bench, but there are 
many conventions and practices that have applied up until now. According to the 
qualification on rights in section 5, are these long recognised conventions and informal 
rules reasonable and justified in restricting the freedom of expression of judges off the 
bench? 
2 Section 5: Justified Limitations 
(a) Prescribed by law 
A component of the inquiry into justified limitations on rights set out in section 
5 of the BORA is to determine what limits are "prescribed by law."33 In Ministry of 
Tran\porl v Noori , Richardson J defined limits " prescribed by law" as those 
restrictions that are:34 
adequately identifiable and accessible by members of the public, and further are formulated 
with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct and to foresee the 
consequences which a given action may entail. 
In a recent case before the European Commission on Human Rights, the Court echoed 
this definition and confirmed that limits must be accessible and precise in order to 
allow individuals to regulate their conduct. 35 
The limit will be prescribed by law if it is expressly provided for in a statute,36 
ifit is a common law rule,37 or if it important in making the statute "workable."38 The 
requirement of "prescribed by law" ensures that interference with rights is justified by 
12 R v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, ex par le Blackbum (No 2) [ 1968] 2 QB, 155 (CA) 
Lord Denning MR. 
33 This requirement was derived from the Canadian Charter on Rights and Freedoms, which itself relied 
heavily on the ICCPR and the ECHR. These three important pieces of rights legislation state that the 
right to freedom of expression may be subject to limitation prescribed by law. 
34 Minislfy of Transport v Noori [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J. 
15 Hashman and Harrup v United Kingdom (2000) 30 EHRR 241 , 249. 
36 
Noori, above, 283 Richardson J. 
37 Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979) 58 TLR 491 , 524; also R v Theren.~ ( 1985) 18 DLR (4th) 655, 
680. 
18 
Beadle v A lien (9 ovember 1999) High Court ew Plymouth AP 42/98, 23 Potter J. 
10 
reference to "objective criteria"39 which are accessible, certain, and clear. Without 
these criteria satisfied, arbitrary interference with rights and freedoms could result. 
(b) Are limits on extra-judicial conduct "prescribed by law"? 
The limits on extra-judicial conduct are not clearly defined. As discussed 
above, the legislation states that judges may be removed for misbehaviour, inability, or 
incapacity, but no limits are set out to define these categories. The principle of judicial 
independence is arguably "prescribed by law" due to its constiMional importance,40 
but again the limits on conduct to protect that independence are not easily determined. 
The informal rules governing extra-judicial conduct are not codified, or even 
found in common law. As AW Bradley wrote, the rules regarding extra-judicial 
conduct are founded to a large extent upon "an untidy mass of non-legal rules, 
customary practices and political expectations. ,,4 J 
Extra-judicial conduct is a subject whose substance is "drawn largely from 
unprovable perceptions of opinion" within the judiciary and the public.42 There is a 
large disparity in judicial activity; Chief Judge Young gave a lengthy interview to the 
Sunday Star-Times43 but other judges are rarely interviewed by the media. Chief Judge 
Young also said he regularly speaks to service clubs, but what does he speak to them 
about? What should he not speak to them about? 
The restrictions on judicial conduct are not adequately identifiable or accessible 
by judges or any other individuals, and are certainly not fonnulated with sufficient 
precision to enable judges in particular to regulate their conduct and to foresee the 
consequences.44 The absence of any concrete definition of the restrictions on judicial 
conduct off the bench means any limits on extra-judicial conduct, including expression, 
are not expressly or impliedly "prescribed by law" in the context of the BORA. 
Section 5 of the BORA states that rights and freedoms may be subject "only" to limits 
39 
Ha hman, above, 251 . 
40 
Hashman, above, 250: "Law" is a concept that can comprise written as well as unwritten law. 
41 
AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - the Kilmuir Rules" [ 1986) Public Law 383, 383 . 
42 
Mr Justice Thomas Judicial Ethics in Austraha (The Law Book Company, Sydney, 1988) 2. 
43 
Rosemary McLeod "Judgement Days" ( 18 March 200 l) Sunday Star-ltmes Wellington C 1. 
44
Ministry of Transport v Noori [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J. 
l l 
prescribed by law. If none of the current restrictions on extra-judicial conduct are 
accessible, certain and clear, section 5 cannot apply. There are no legal limits on 
judicial freedom of expression. 
But the reality is that the majority of judges are still silent off the bench, despite 
having a legal right to freedom of expression, and despite the law making it difficult 
for judges to be removed from the bench. Why are judges not speaking up? 
V SELF-CENSORSHIP 
Judges in New Zealand are constrained by the expectations of fellow judges, 
the profession and the public to act ' judicially." 45 Doyle CJ writes, "most judges 
accept that [restrictions on conduct] are binding, and not observed merely as a matter 
of choice.',46 Although judges have legal rights to express themselves off the bench, 
they often choose not to. The reality is that the limits imposed on judges are self-
imposed. The judiciary censors itself. 
Judges err on the side of caution to avoid the risk, inconvenience, and 
misunderstanding thought to accompany speaking outside the courtroom. These self-
imposed limitations have a "chilling effect" on the freedom of expression47 as the 
possible risks or inconvenience of speaking out triumph over the fundamental right to 
freedom of expression. This suggests that judges seem complacent about their rights 
as citizens. Grant Huscroft argues that New Zealanders have "never seriously 
challenged [their] expectations and assumptions about freedom of expression, 
and ... are the worse for it.',48 The judiciary is "worse" for accepting blanket limitations 
on its right to speak off the bench. Judges, as citizens of New Zealand, are "worse" for 
not taking an interest in their right to freedom of expression. 
45 
Philip A Joseph Constitulional and Admimstrallve Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Co, North 
Ryde, 1993), 237. 
46 
Hon John Doyle "Judicial Standards: Contemporary Constraints on Judges - The Australian 
Experience" (2001) 75 ALJ, 98. 
47 
Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" in Grant Huscroft and 
Paul Rishworth (eds) Rights and freedoms: The New Zealand Bill ~f Rights Act 1990 and the Human 
Rights Act 1993 (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 176. 
48 
Grant Huscroft "Defamation, Racial Disharmony, and Freedom of Expression" above, 172. 
12 
Judges have the legal right to speak out on the "controversies of the day."49 
And certainly, most judges wouJd agree that the values codified in the BORA must be 
upheld. But should judges be able to say anything they want? Even though they have 
a legal right to do so, should judges meddle in the partisan politics of daily life, for 
example? Should boundaries be drawn around judicial free speech? 
Rights "do not exist in a vacuum."50 They can be abrogated to take into 
account public interest, as well as the rights of individuals and the community. 
Although it is necessary to recognise the importance of human rights and freedoms as 
affirmed by the BORA, it is also equally necessary to recognise that the standards 
placed on judges are more stringent than those placed on the rest of the public. Judges 
are like "supercitizens" because of the extensive authority they have over the lives of 
their fellow citizens. 51 Theirs is a higher standard. To strive for "pure" freedom of 
expression would be a dangerous course: 52 
[J]udges render judgments; they do not provide services ... [T]he purpose of independence is to 
ensure not that they are comfortable, but that they are impartial in the execution of their office. 
Some values must necessarily be seen as "predominating" over freedom of 
expression.53 These are the values of independence, impartiality, and public 
confidence. 
VJ "PREDOMINATING VALUES" 
A Independence 
The principle of judicial independence is one on which the judicial institution is 
founded. Doyle CJ writes that the scope of judicial independence can be debated, but 
"there is no doubt about its fundamental importance."54 John Locke endorsed judicial 
49 AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - The Kilmuir Rules" [1986] Public Law 383, 385. 
50 
Ministry of Transporl v Noori [1992] 3 NZLR 260, 283 (CA) Richardson J. 
51 
Beverley Smith "Judicial Free Speech in Canada" (1996) 45 UNBLJ 161 , 162. 
52 
Judicial Conduct Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council Public Inquiry into the Conduct of Mr 
Justice Jean Bienvenue (Superior Court of Quebec) in R v Theberge (Ottawa, 1996), 52 
<http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca> (last accessed 12 July 2001 ). 
51 
Moonen v Film and Literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 15 (CA) Tipping J for the Court . 
54 
Hon John Doyle "Judicial Standards: Contemporary Constraints on Judges - The Australian 
Experience" (2001) 75 ALJ 96, 97 . 
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independence to ensure that the law would not "be varied in particular cases, but [be 
the same] for rich and poor, for the favourite at court and the countryman at plough."55 
The common law concept of judicial independence began when the judiciary in 
England won security of tenure with the Act of Settlement 1700. In order to ensure 
judges remained independent of other agencies, and the Crown in particular, the Act 
made it extremely difficult to remove judges from their offices for political or other 
reasons. Since then, there has been only one Parliamentary removal of a judge in the 
United Kingdom. 56 
The principle of independence means that the judiciary cannot be seen to be 
under the influence of anyone. It protects judges from executive interference and 
political entanglements. In many countries, this principle is constitutionally 
entrenched.57 In the 1994 Hamlyn lectures, Lord Mackay of Clashfem, the Lord 
Chancellor, stated:58 
What do I mean by the independence of the judiciary? l mean that. .. a judge deciding a case 
should do so without any influence being brought to bear upon him to decide it one way or 
another by any agency outside himself. 
New Zealand lacks a single written constitutional document that creates the 
judiciary and defines what its powers are,59 but the principle of judicial independence 
remains fundamental and is protected in other ways. Judicial tenure is protected by 
the Constitution Act 1986 and by the District Courts Act 1947. Judicial salaries are 
protected by statute to ensure judges do not have to seek remuneration elsewhere; 
judicial salaries cannot be reduced,60 and budget supply for them is guaranteed.6 1 
55 
Peter Laslett (ed) Second Treatise on Gol'ernment (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1988), s 
142 at 363. 
56 
Canadian Judicial Council <http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca> (last accessed 2 June 2001 ) 
57 
See Harris v Minister for the Interior [ 1952] 2 SALR 428 : the South African appellate court ruled the 
constitution of that country did not allow for the Parliament to be its own court. The judiciary is trained 
in law and outside the influence of others, and is the only body able to provide "honest and efficient" 
management of the law. See also L,yanage v The Queen [ 1967] l AC 259: the Privy Council ruled it 
was unconstitutional for the government of Ceylon (Sri Lanka) to usurp the power of the judiciary. The 
institution of the judiciary is founded on the fundamental principle of independence. 
58 
Rt Hon The Lord Mackay of Clashfern The Hamlyn Lectures ./5'h Series: The Administration of 
Justice (Stevens and Sons, London, l 994) 12. 
59 
The Constitution Act 1986 takes note of the continuing existence of the three branches of government, 
but does not actually establish them. 
6° Constitution Act 1986, s 24. 
6] J d' u 1cature Act 1908, s 9A(l) 
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B Impartiality 
Impartiality is a core value of judicial office. John Locke wrote that the 
adjudication of disputes by neutral judges is the most important benefit of 
civilisation.62 
The independence of the judiciary is closely linked with notions of impartiality. 
"The overall objective of guaranteeing judicial independence is to ensure a reasonable 
perception ofimpartiality;judicial independence is but a 'means' to this 'end'.',63 The 
objective of having an impartial judiciary is to maintain an institution that is not only 
free from influence by others, but also as non-partisan as possible. The right to be tried 
by an independent and impartial tribunal is an integral part of the principles of justice, 
and is protected by section 25(a) of the BORA. Section 18 of the Oaths and 
Declarations Act 1957 codifies impartiality: judges must "do right to all manner of 
people after the laws and usages of New Zealand without fear or favour, affection or ill 
will." Section 10(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights subjects freedom of 
expression to "such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties for maintaining the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary." 
A judge should not sit on a case if the reasonable person, informed of all the 
circumstances, would detect any bias on the part of the judge.64 Pecuniary interest in 
the subject or outcome of a case65 or bias through predetermination may threaten 
impartiality. In R v Bow Street Metropo/;tan Stipendiary Magistrate, h'x parte 
Pinochet Ugarte, it was revealed that Lord Hoffman, who sat on the original case, had 
close connections with Amnesty International, one of the more prominent groups 
protesting Pinochet's human rights record and extradition. The House of Lords found 
62 
Peter W Hogg Constitutional Law of Canada (3 ed, Carswell, Toronto, 1992) 168. 
63 
RvLippe[l991]2SCR 114, l39(SCC)LamerCJC. 
64 
S & M Motor Repair Pty Limited v Cal!ex Oil (Australia) Pty Umited ( 1988) l 2 NSWLR 358. The 
Court of Appeal was split on the test. Kirby J thought the test for bias should be the reasonable person; 
Clarke and Priestly JJ felt the test should be the reasonable person with inside knowledge and a good 
understanding of the law. 
65 
Dimes v Grand Junction Canal ( 1852) 10 ER 30 I. It was discovered that the Lord Chancellor held 
shares in the plaintiff's company, and his ruling was subsequently voided. 
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that Lord Hoffman should have been dismissed from hearing the case. They 
reconvened with a new panel of judges. 66 
C Public Confidence 
Public confidence in the judiciary is tied inextricably to those values of 
independence and impartiality. In a democracy, the enforcement of judicial decrees 
and orders ultimately rests upon public cooperation. This level of cooperation, in turn, 
depends on the perception that judges decide cases independently and impartially. If 
this confidence were lost, the judicial system could not function . Should the citizenry 
conclude, even erroneously, that cases were decided on the basis of favouritism or 
prejudice rather than according to law and fact, then something stronger than the court 
system would be necessary to enforce judgments. The judiciary may be founded on 
the principles of independence and impartiality, but without public confidence in the 
system, these principles are meaningless. 
The principles of independence, impartiality, and public confidence are 
critically dependent on one another. Together, they maintain and strengthen the 
judiciary. To preserve these principles, judges need to aspire to a higher standard of 
conduct. How should this affect their ability to express themselves off the bench? 
How should judicial freedom of expression be defined? 
VII JUDICIAL FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has examined the balancing act between 
upholding rights and freedoms and acknowledging reasonable limits on those rights. It 
enables judges to explore the interaction between the BORA and apparently 
inconsistent statutes. It allows judges to determine an appropriate set of limits on a 
right in cases where limits are obviously intended but not specified. In Ministry of 
Tran::,port v Noort ,61 the Court of Appeal expanded on the test set out in the Canadian 
case of R v Oakes68 to determine what are reasonable limits on rights and freedoms. 
66 
R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.2) [1999] 2 WLR 
272. 
67 
Ministry of Transport v Noori [ 1992] 3 NZLR 260 (CA) 
68 
R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR 4th 200: acceptance of the Oakes test in New Zealand appeared in the 
judgment of Richardson Jin Noori, above, 284. 
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The Court of Appeal in Moonen v Film and Literature Review Board recently clarified 
the test.69 Here, the test assists in determining whether the traditional unwritten 
restrictions on extra-judicial speech are justified. 
Firstly, it is important to identify the objective that the judiciary is 
endeavouring to achieve by heavily restricting freedom of expression off the bench. 
This objective, as discussed above, revolves entirely around the judiciary appearing 
independent and impartial at all times. 
Secondly, the importance and significance of maintaining the appearance of 
independence and impartiality must be assessed. The public's confidence in the 
independence and impartiality of the judiciary is crucial lest the public begin to doubt 
the judiciary's ability to judge. If a judge says or does something off the bench that 
suggests to the public that he or she is under the influence of a particular group, or that 
the judge's ability to hear and decide a case could be biased, the institution of the 
judiciary suffers. 
Thirdly, the way in which the objective is achieved must be assessed. This 
involves applying a proportionality test. Currently, the judiciary insists on maintaining 
the appearance of independence and impartiality by remaining virtually silent and 
unseen outside the courtroom. As Tipping J remarked in Moonen, "a sledge hammer 
should not be used to crack a nut'' when it comes to balancing rights and freedoms with 
reasonable limitations, and there must be "as little interference as possible" with the 
freedom. 70 The almost total self-censorship of the judiciary off the bench is not a 
rational or proportionate solution to concerns about independence and impartiality. 
The restrictions placed on extra-judicial conduct do not interfere with freedom of 
expression as little as possible; rather, the restrictions interfere almost completely with 
the freedom. 
To be valid, the restrictions on judicial freedom of expression must also be 
justifiable in light of the objective. Certainly, extra-judicial expression needs to be 
restricted in some way if the values of independence and impartiality are to be upheld. 
For example, the independence of judges would necessarily be questioned if they 
~~ Moonen v Film and literature Board of Review [2000] 2 NZLR 9, 16-17 (CA) 
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began to join the fray as combatants in the political forum. The need for some limits 
on judicial free speech does not mean, however, that full censorship is justified. The 
current restrictions are neither proportionate nor rational. By remaining silent, the 
New Zealand judiciary risks damaging the public confidence that is so crucial to its 
survival. 
The values of independence, impartiality, and public confidence, which are so 
important to the survival of the judiciary, must be revisited with an eye to freedom of 
expression. 
VIII "PREDOMINATING VALUES" REVISITED 
A Independence Revisited 
Some commentators insist that discretion is "vital" to the independence of the 
judiciary,71 and that the "moment [a judge] steps into controversy, or even indicates 
that he [ or she] has views, all respect for the law itself will collapse. "72 If 
independence of the judiciary is risked, the argument goes, so is the rule oflaw. 
The principle of independence has also been used to protect those judges who 
speak too candidly. The California Supreme Court publicly censured a judge who 
consistently used racial and ethnic epithets against African-Americans, Filipinos, and 
Mexicans.73 In his dissent against the majority's decision to discipline the judge, 
Justice Mosk argued that "when judges at any level are to be disciplined for their 
manner of expression, however primitive, then we no longer have an independent 
judiciary in California."74 Quebec Supreme Court Justice Jean Bienvenue defended his 
derogatory comments against women and Jews by arguing that judicial independence 
must take precedence over the values of individuals.75 
70 
Moonen, above, 16. 
71 
Philip A Joseph C'onsJitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (The Law Book Co, North 
Ryde, 1993), 237. 
72 
Bernard Levin (28 February 1986) The Times in Mr Justice Thomas Judicial Ethics in Australia (The 
Law Book Company, Sydney, 1988) 34. 
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Judicial Conduct Committee of the Canadian Judicial Council Public Inquiry into the Conduct of Mr 
Justice Jean Bienvenue (Superior Co11rl of Quebec) in R v Theberge (Ottawa, 1996), 17. 
<http://www.cjc-ccm.gc.ca> (last accessed 12 July 2001). In 1996, Bienvenue J made derogatory 
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Certainly, judges have complete liberty to decide the cases that come before 
them. "Judicial independence carries with it not merely the right to tenure during good 
behaviour, it encompasses, and indeed encourages, a corollary judicial duty to exercise 
and articulate independent thought in judgments free from fear of removal."76 Judges 
do not have to be popular; they simply have to dispense justice, free of any outside 
interference or influence. 
It seems strange, therefore, that an institution that prides itself on its 
independence, and that places great historical and contemporary weight on its ability to 
supervise and adjudicate issues of law independent of outside influences, chooses to 
silence itself Would not full judicial independence include being free to say whatever 
one thought appropriate, rather than restricting oneself to silence? Recently, a judge of 
the Court of Appeal of New South Wales was strongly criticised for describing, outside 
the courtroom, a law as unjust.77 The judge' s controversial comments were seen as a 
threat to the separation of powers and a breach of judicial independence. But judicial 
independence has nothing to do with quiet subservience to perceived injustice, nor with 
silencing a personal view. To avoid speaking out on "controversies of the day"78 seems 
to suggest that judges lack the authority to speak their minds. But a judge's right to 
express himself off the bench does not come by way of permission from the legislature 
or the executive. In this sense, silence is the antithesis of judicial independence. 
The principle of judicial independence is firmly founded on ensurmg that 
judges decide cases fairly, according to the law, and irrespective of political pressure. 
Independence from the legislature and the executive, as well as from special interest 
groups or individuals with private agendas, is what must be guarded against. There is 
much scope for extra-judicial free speech without putting judicial independence at risk. 
comments about women in a judgment, and repeated those comments to reporters in several interviews 
afterwards. He maintained that "when [women] decide to degrade themselves, they sink to depths to 
which even the vilest man could not sink." The CJC recommended Bienvenue J be removed from 
office. 
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Sirros v Moore [1974] 3 WLR 459, 467 (CA) Lord Denning MR. 
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Athol Moffitt "Judges, Royal Commissioners and the Separation of Powers" [May 2000] Quadrant. 78 
AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - The Kilmuir Rules" [l 986] Public Law 383, 385. 
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B Impartiality Revisited 
Without impartiality, there can be no confidence in the administration of 
justice, and the system would cease to operate effectively. 79 Traditionally, any conduct 
or speech by judges outside the courtroom could be seen to threaten that impartiality. 
Such a view of impartiality assumes neutrality, both in and out of court. 
In 1994, Justice Angers, a Court of Appeal justice from New Brunswick, wrote 
an open letter to the Prime Minister of Canada criticising proposed legislative controls 
on gun ownership.80 He was strongly criticised by the Canadian Judicial Council as 
having compromised his impartiality by embarking on a "highly partisan attack upon a 
proposal which ... could well come frequently before [Justice Angers] for interpretation 
or enforcement. "81 
Angers ' open letter did not affect his "impartiality" in any real way. The judge 
wrote that he had "forty years of using guns for recreation,"82 and his strong personal 
views on gun legislation were only made public because he was inspired enough to 
write the letter. Justice Angers was partisan long before he wrote the letter. This case, 
and the Canadian Judicial Council ' s response to it, highlights one of the realities of the 
judicial office. It is a mistake to insist that judges must be, or even can be, completely 
free of ideological beliefs and political values. Judges are humans, not robots. 
Practically, impartiality can not be insisted on as an absolute ideal. 
If one accepts that the identities and ideologies of judges affect what happens in 
the courtroom, one must also admit that judicial conduct outside the courtroom cannot 
be neutralised either. Accepting a judicial appointment cannot practically mean one 
automatically gives up one' s ideology and political values upon doing so. Judicial 
decision-making involves choice, not just interpretation. Thomas J writes that it is a 
79 
AW Bradley "Judges and the Media - The Kilmuir Rules" (1986) Public Law 383, 385; Lamer CJC in 
R v Lippe, above, 139; Le Dain Jin R v 'Valente [1985) 2 SCR 673, 689. 
80 
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82 
Angers, above, 183 . 
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mistake to place too much faith in the idea of an " impersonal law." Judges make 
"fresh judgments" based on personal perceptions in every case.83 
But impartiality need not be threatened by reality. True impartiality is less 
about the absence of personal views and opinions than the capacity to prevent such 
views and opinions from interfering with the ability to act on different points of view. 
"Whether or not a judge [is] biased ... becomes less instructive an exercise than whether 
or not the judge' s decision or conduct reflected an incapacity to hear and decide a case 
with an open mind."84 A more liberal , and honest, approach to impartiality is needed. 
C Public Confidence Revisited 
There is another important reason for encouraging a less conservative approach 
to extra-judicial conduct. An acceptance of the values of independence and impartiality 
is an obligation that comes with the judicial office, but so is the obligation of 
preserving and improving public confidence. If the public does not respect the 
judiciary, it will not respect their authority to adjudicate. The judiciary is a "fragile 
bastion"85 indeed when one understands that the success of the judiciary is wholly 
dependent on the public' s confidence in it. Necessarily, maintaining public confidence 
is key. 
In the case mentioned above regarding the judge from California disciplined for 
making racial slurs off the bench, the court acknowledged the offending judge had 
performed his judicial duties "free from actual bias against any person regardless of 
race."86 Justice Mosk, in his dissent, was deeply offended that the judge should have 
been disciplined. But the majority recognised that public perception of the judge was 
the most important factor. Although the judge had not in fact let his prejudice affect 
83 
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his work to any noticeable degree, the mere appearance of prejudice was enough to 
threaten the judiciary. 
Some judges, while recogmsmg the fundamental importance of public 
confidence in the judiciary, are nevertheless wary of the judiciary' s need to be 
accountable to the public. Lamer CJC writes that judges owe accountability to the law, 
not to "electors."87 "Any deviation from norms of judicial speech which results in 
public scrutiny erodes public respect."88 The Kilmuir Rules insists judges must not do 
anything, such as appear in the media, which could bring them within the "focus of 
. · · ,,89 cnt1c1sm. 
With respect, this is a mistaken approach. The citizens to whom judges are 
accountable are their constituents, not their electors. Independence and impartiality 
requirements exist to protect judges from executive interference and political 
entanglements, but such requirements do not need to impair public perception of the 
judiciary. On the contrary, independence and accountability are complementary, rather 
than conflicting, ideals.90 
Recently, judges have increasingly begun to write less cryptic and technical 
judgments in an attempt to become accessible to a broader audience. 91 This should be 
applauded. Judges should be encouraged to communicate more directly with the 
public in order to maintain and improve the legitimacy of the institution. The public 
cannot be expected to respect decisions made by judges who perpetuate an institution 
shrouded in mystery. The judiciary need not get its legitimacy from secrecy or a lack 
of understanding. That legitimacy need only come from adherence to the law, and the 
maintenance of independence, impartiality, and public confidence. 
87 
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The public should be able to see the functioning of the court, not just in the 
limited sphere of open courtrooms and published judgments, but through judicial 
conduct off the bench. The public should understand that judges have ideologies and 
personal beliefs in addition to extensive legal experience and knowledge. The public 
must see that judges are people who have been given real powers in society. 
Society must resist any attempt to insulate official power from public scrutiny. 
Public criticism is the lifeblood of a healthy democratic society. Judges, both 
individually and collectively, must respect the public' s trust and respond to its 
criticisms. A silent judiciary does nothing to enhance public confidence. 
Certainly, judges must take care that neither their speech nor their conduct 
transgresses principles of impartiality and independence. A liberal test can 
accommodate these principles, as well as maintaining and revitalising public 
confidence in the judiciary. 
IX THETEST 
The current restrictions on extra-judicial speech, although not prescribed by law 
and difficult to define, have resulted in the silence of the judiciary off the bench. 
These restrictions produce the twin problems of unreasonably limiting freedom of 
expression and seriously threatening the public' s confidence in the judiciary. But what 
should be the standard of conduct? A practical test must be developed to define the 
boundaries of extra-judicial conduct, while upholding judicial freedom of expression, 
maintaining independence and impartiality, and enhancing public confidence in the 
judiciary. The following approach would be helpful : 
Is the conduct so clearly destructive of the judicial responsibilities of impartiality and 
independence that it would create in the public a perception that the judge' s ability to 
execute the judicial office is sufficiently undermined? 
This approach requires the judge considering whether to speak off the bench, or 
the public, media, or disciplinary board analysing extra-judicial expression after the 
fact , to take several important steps before considering whether to speak off the bench. 
LAW LIBR qy 23 
VICTORIA U, IVER::il fY OF WELLINGTON 
Firstly, the conduct must be "clearly destructive" of judicial responsibilities. This sets 
a high threshold for proving whether such conduct should be restricted and therefore 
goes a long way in protecting judicial independence. Anything less than "clearly 
destructive" would not be considered inappropriate. Secondly, the values of 
"impartiality and independence" are singled out as prime considerations. As shown 
above, these values are key to the foundation and maintenance of the judiciary. 
Thirdly, that the conduct would create a "perception" of inability highlights an 
understanding that real impartiality is virtually impossible to obtain. The appearance 
of impartiality is a more practical goal. Fourthly, execution of the "judicial office" is 
the focus, that is, the ability of the judge to do his or her job on the bench. This 
highlights the high standard required of judges in the performance of their duties. 
Fifthly, public perception must be "sufficiently undermined," again setting a high 
threshold test for restricting off the bench conduct in order to preserve and enhance the 
right to freedom of expression. 
Who is the "public" for the purposes of this test? The concept of maintaining 
public confidence necessarily involves some element of community views, and the 
determination of what is therefore appropriate or inappropriate extra-judicial speech 
thus requires the judge to refer to what he or she conceives to be the views of the 
community at large. 
Any test for judicial conduct must rely on a reasonable person standard. The 
reasonable person is the average person in the community, dispassionate and fully 
apprised of the circumstances of the case. This does riot mean that evidence of the 
public's perception will be determinative of the issue. Judicial opinions may be 
controversial and still satisfy a reasonable person standard. Judges are entitled to their 
own ideas and need not follow the fashion of the day or meet the strictures of political 
correctness; they should not be required to ensure that their remarks are acceptable to 
every sector of the population. It is an objective standard of conduct which could 
reasonably create in the public a perception that the judge' s ability to execute the 
judicial office is be sufficiently undermined, as opposed to conduct which is, and often 
must be, unpopular with part of that public. This avoids questions of morality or 
propriety. The apprehension of bias must be "a reasonable one, held by reasonable and 
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right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the 
required information."92 
This test solves the twin problems mentioned earlier. On one hand, for 
expression to be restricted, it must be "clearly destructive" of judicial responsibilities. 
This strict test stresses a respect for freedom of expression, and leaves much room for 
extra-judicial speech. On the other hand, the test does not undervalue the importance of 
the public' s confidence in the judiciary; in fact, the test hinges on the perception of the 
public. 
By formulating a test for extra-judicial expression, it is possible to draw a line 
between speech that should be restricted, and speech that should be protected. Such a 
test has not yet been developed by the judiciary in New Zealand. 
X APPLYING THE TEST 
The test outlined above favours a relaxing of the traditional rules governing 
judges speaking off the bench. But easing the limits on extra-judicial conduct is not 
about creating unrestricted judicial licence. How might the test work in practical 
terms? 
A Media Interaction 
Judges should be encouraged to work with the media. The judiciary must 
recognise the importance of the news media and work with them to heighten public 
knowledge, respect, and confidence of the judiciary. Certainly, this process works 
both ways; the media must face the judiciary with informed and accurate reporting. 
Ground rules for appearing in media should be firmly laid down due to the 
"uncontrolled nature of the process. "93 
Chief Judge Young expressed great frustration with the public for 
"misapprehending almost everything about the system. "94 But it is judges who are best 
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suited to provide correct information and set a constructive tone about the 
administration of justice. Who better to shed some reasoned light on a current debate 
than the very people the public trusts to administer justice? Judges are well equipped 
to explain the law, and they should not be deterred from doing so. 
Discussion of current or pending cases could indicate prejudgment and 
impartiality, and should be avoided. While judges cannot comment to the media on the 
merits of pending cases, they should feel free to explain legal terms, procedures and 
concepts so that the media report relevant issues intelligently and accurately. 
Discussion of legal issues of contemporary relevance should be encouraged. 
B Civic and Charitable Activities 
Many judges currently make public speeches to clubs and legal conferences, 
and write legal texts and academic works. This activity should not cease, although 
caution must always be taken in choosing both topic and message. Some issues, like 
highly controversial political issues, should clearly be avoided. 
Involvement in educational, religious, charitable, cultural, and c1v1c 
organisations should not be restricted, as long as that involvement is not for economic 
or political advantage. As well, judges should be mindful of the organisation' s 
potential to be involved in litigation, where judicial involvement could destroy 
perceptions of independence or impartiality. Speaking and writing on the law and on 
the procedure of courts should be encouraged, as should comment and discussion on 
controversial current legal issues. As long as the perception of impartiality and 
obedience to the law is upheld, such off the bench expression will not offend the test 
proposed above. 
C Political Activity 
Political endorsements should be avoided lest there is a perception by the 
public that a judge is abusing the prestige of the office. Likewise, expressing personal 
opinions on controversial current political issues would offend the proposed test. 
26 
,Xl CASE STUDIES REVISTED 
It is useful now to return to the three factual scenarios discussed at the start of 
the essay, and examine them in the light of the proposed test. Durie J's sentencing of 
the two women convicted of killing a child in their care was harshly criticised in a 
national newspaper. Should Durie J have been interviewed for the article as well? 
The range of expression available to Durie J in such a situation was large. For 
example, he might have made himself available to the reporters to clarify certain points 
of his judgment. A clear explanation or amplification of his decision, in non-legal 
terms, would have been very useful. Sentencing is currently a very contentious issue in 
New Zealand. As the article suggests, many feel judges are being soft on offenders. 
Applying the test set out above, an explanation by Durie J of his decision would not be 
"highly destructive" of the public' s perception of judicial impartiality or independence. 
The Judge would be informing the public of the legal rules he must follow. Even if he 
expressed some personal comment on the merit of the law, he would still be stressing 
his impartiality because he applied the law as he must. Rather than undermining the 
public' s confidence in the judiciary, Durie J would be seizing a valuable opportunity to 
set a constructive tone for the debate on sentencing. By helping the reporter to explain 
the rules of sentencing, he would be helping the public better understand the system. 
Judge Christiansen resigned from the District Court amid rumour and 
speculation of criminal activity. He was quoted as saying the "strains of the job" 
forced him to leave. The public is left with a sense of unease: if Judge Christiansen did 
nothing wrong, why did he resign so suddenly? Are the reasons he gave valid? 
This story does little for public confidence in the judiciary and is a good 
example of a situation where it might have been better for the judge to speak up rather 
than remain silent. Judge Christiansen, or perhaps the Chief District Court Judge, 
might have made themselves available for comment to clarify the situation and to 
elaborate on or deny any rumours. If criminal conduct did occur, the above test is 
easily satisfied as such conduct is "clearly destructive" of judicial responsibilities. If 
the Judge did in fact do something inappropriate, possibly illegal, he should confront 
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the issue and admit his mistake. Such a public admission would increase confidence in 
the judiciary, not diminish it. 
If the rumours have no basis, Judge Christiansen has two choices available to 
him: he can remain silent or he can exercise his right to speak off the bench. The 
Judge' s silence, and the silence of his colleagues, in itself creates in the public a 
perception that the judge' s ability has been sufficiently undermined. The test is not 
satisfied, however, because the Judge' s inaction cannot be said to be clearly destructive 
of his responsibilities of independence and impartiality. In this way, the test does not 
punish the choice to remain silent. Alternatively, Judge Christiansen might speak out 
publicly to set the record straight. This option is most satisfying because it would 
bolster public confidence in a judiciary that is willing to make such matters 
transparent. While potentialJy painful and embarrassing, there must be a certain 
amount of "public relations" to the job of a judge; as shown above, public 
accountability is the linchpin of the system. 
The third example involved three Court of Appeal judges who attended a 
closed-door briefing by the Government to persuade a Member of Parliament to 
reconsider his stance on an upcoming Bill. Is this a case of the "executive calling on 
the judiciary to lobby the legislature"?95 
All members of the judiciary have the right to express their views on the 
"controversies of the day." But by agreeing to meet privately with a Member of 
Parliament in order to discuss a proposed piece of legislation with benefits for these 
judges, the judges struck at the heart of any appearance of impartiality. There were 
certainly other options available to them: they might have attended the select 
committee hearings on the bill , or they might have sent public officials to provide any 
relevant information to the Member of Parliament. The judges should have insisted any 
briefing or advocacy by them have been in an open, non-party forum . Applying the 
test, their conduct was clearly destructive of judicial independence. It creates in the 
public a perception that the judges have a very personal interest in the Bill, and that 
they are able to influence the government to promote its passing. This in turn suggests 
95 
Steven Price "Dangers in Judges Briefing Tanczos" ( 19 June 2001) The Evening Post Wellington 6. 
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the judges' abilities to remam independent of political manipulation have been 
sufficiently undermined. 
Even after applying the proposed test to determine if extra-judicial conduct 
should be limited in a certain situation, judges are faced with a wide range of possible 
options. In an effort to assist the judiciary, the case for written guidelines on extra-
judicial conduct is compelling. It is time for the judiciary in New Zealand to define 
what is acceptable extra-judicial speech and what is not, rather than simply relying on 
the traditional notions of the "insulated" judge.96 Complacency is irresponsible and 
dangerous. 
XII CONCLUSION 
The judiciary is a "fragile bastion."97 It rests primarily upon constitutional 
conventions and Jong standing practices. The rules regarding extra-judicial conduct are 
founded to a large extent upon "an untidy mass of non-legal rules, customary practices 
and political expectations. "98 
The "golden rule ... that silence is always [the best] option"99 continues to apply 
in New Zealand today. But it is a rule that threatens the rights and freedoms of judges, 
as well as public confidence in the judiciary. Judicial self-censorship is dangerous 
because it serves to restrict judges from imparting information and opinions in the 
public sphere. The judiciary cannot justify restricting its freedom of expression without 
compromising this fundamental right beyond what is reasonable or necessary. 
As Hon John Doyle writes, an individual cannot "sensibly" join the judiciary 
and then flout and disregard the principles that preserve and maintain the institution. 100 
Judges therefore need to be singled out for special treatment with respect to their 
freedom of expression, but there is still much room to challenge traditional notions of 
extra-judicial speech. 
96 
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Balancing freedom of expression with the prestige of the office does not have 
to be a question of extremes, a choice between keeping judges in ivory towers or 
allowing them to say what they want. 101 Extra-judicial conduct should be restricted 
only when it is so clearly destructive of the judicial responsibilities of impartiality and 
independence, that it would create in the public a perception that the judge' s ability to 
execute the judicial office is sufficiently undermined. A judiciary that is open to 
communication, and necessarily, to scrutiny, enhances public knowledge about and 
confidence in the justice system. 
As with all freedoms, there will be those judges who will speak in a way that 
includes the "irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome and 
the provocative."102 Protecting judicial expression may come at a high price, but it is 
worth the risk to have an accountable and fully independent judiciary. The risk of 
embarrassment should not be reason enough to restrict a fundamental freedom . 103 
Chief Judge Young is ever concerned with defending the judiciary from a 
public that "misapprehend[s]" it. 104 In a speech at the 11 th Commonwealth Law 
Conference in Vancouver, he asked "who else will speak for [the judiciary] and present 
the balanced picture?" 105 Ultimately, the answer is that no one but the judiciary is 
capable of doing so. Judges must challenge themselves and each other to define what 
is acceptable extra-judicial expression and what is not. That is the ultimate preservation 
of judicial independence, impartiality and public confidence. Judges must support and 
promote their right to speak out, even on the "controversies of the day." 106 
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